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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. 34A-l-303(2)(b); 34A-l-303(6); 34A-2-801(7); and 34A-2-801(8)(a).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF VIEW
Issue 1: Jenkins stated; "Whether the medical records exhibit was sufficiently exhaustive
and properly relied upon by the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission when
denying Benson's request for permanent total disability benefits.
My reply to this issue is included in the body of this Reply Brief.
Standard of Review:
Jenkins stated; "This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation
and application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-1(H) which
governs the form and creation of the medical records exhibit.
My Reply to this statement is included in the body of this Reply Brief. The cases
that Fve referenced as a standard are included in my original Brief.
Issue 2: Jenkins stated; "Whether the Administrative Law Judge and Labor
Commission abused their discretion by denying Benson's permanent total disability claim
without submitting the question of causation to a medical panel.
My reply to this issue is also in the body of this reply.
Standard for Review:
Jenkins stated; "This issue involves the challenge of an agency's interpretation
and application of statute, specifically Utah Administrative Rule 602-2-2 which governs
the utilization of medical panels."

1

My Reply to this statement is also included in the body of this Reply Brief. The
cases that Fve referenced as a standard are included in my original Brief.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES

The determinative statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in Addendum
A. Their citations are Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420(l); Utah
Code Ann. 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-801; Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-802(l); Utah
Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(a) - changed to 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(9) changed to 34A-2-601; Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-8(2); Utah Code Ann. 63-46B-14; Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedures, Title II, Rule 11, (b)(1)(c); Utah Administrative Code
R568-1-9 - changed to R602-2-2; Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(A4); Utah
Administrative Code R602-2-l(A5); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(A6); Utah
Administrative Code R602-2-l(Hl); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H2); Utah
Administrative Code R602-2-l(H3); Utah Administrative Code R602-2-l(H4); Utah
Administrative Code R602-2-2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I, the appellant, respectfully request that this court do two things. First, reverse
the decision of the Administrative Law Judge ("ALP'), the Labor Commission ('the
commission") and, the Commissioner. Secondly, give the final approval of my request
for permanent total compensation benefits effective October 1,2000.
REPLY -

The Appellee in this case, Jenkins, would surely like this court to overlook

the preponderance of substantial evidence that is more than sufficient to approve my
request for permanent total disability compensation, like the ALJ, commission and the
commissioner did. For the most part, this evidence in cited throughout the Benson Brief.
On page 3, line 16, in the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "At the emergency
room, I reported that I had twisted my right foot, landed on my right knee and foot and
that a piece of sheet rock has landed on my left foot (R. Vol. 2 at 11,12).
REPLY -

First, that is not what I reported at the emergency room. Secondly, as

stated in my brief, this description conflicts with the emergency room notes at (R. Vol. 2,
page 3) which, although not detailed, is closer to what happened. Jenkins also noted that
the x-rays showed a fracture in the right foot, but no injuries to the left foot. (R. Vol. 2 at
12).
REPLY -

Doctor McLaughlin at the emergency room wrote the notes that Jenkins

referenced above. However, he also wrote, "Examination of the left foot reveals minimal
swelling if any to the dorsum of his left foot. It is tender near the cuneiform bones." (R.
Vol. 2 at 11). Dr. McLaughlin also made out my individualized instructions for further
care. In which he stated; "You have fractured your toe." He also stated; "Some diseases
worsen despite proper treatment Some problems begin with unusual symptoms and
3

require time before the correct diagnosis can be made." This has been and is most
certainly my situation. (R. Vol. 2 at 8).
REPLY -

Again, I'm sure that the Appellee would like this court to believe that

there was only one injury caused by my on the job accident and that injury was minor and
simple to treat. When in reality, although overlooked by the ALJ, Commission, and the
Commissioner, there were multiple injuries, many of which were complex as shown in
the Medical Records.
My industrial accident occurred on October 3,1997. I saw Dr. Gordon for the
first time on October 6,1997 at which time he wasn't satisfied with the diagnosis from
the emergency room and/or the x-ray. He couldn't see the full extent of the injuries
because of the extensive swelling. (R. Vol. 2 at 132). After 6 or 8 more x-rays, none of
which were any clearer than the first one,finally,on October 23,19971 had a C.T. Scan
at Alta View Hospital. (R. Vol. 2 at 14). On October 27,19971 met with Dr. Gordon to
discuss the C.T. Scan report. During this process Dr. Gordon noticed even more damage
on the C.T. Scan than what had been cited in the report. (R. Vol. 2 at 133). Refer to the
operation report and Dr. Gordon's notes for those details. (R. Vol. 2 at 28,29, and 33).
The C.T. Scan showed enough of the damage that Dr. Gordonfinally,after almost five
weeks scheduled surgery on November 5,1997. (R. Vol. 2 at 28).
On Page 4, Line 5, Jenkins stated; "Benson's recovery from surgery went well
and he was released to work on January 26,1998." (R. Vol. 2 at 140).
REPLY -

Again, I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that my

recovery not only went well, but also did not cause me any on going problems. However,
that was not and still is not the case as the medical evidence clearly shows.
4

I met with Dr. Gordon on November 10,1997 and he noted; "in one week I would
like to see him back for repeat examination. Hopefully at that point he can do a sitting
job. He understands it will be a good six to eight weeks for healing." (R. Vol. 2 at 135),
Because of on going problems, it ended up being about 11 weeks.
By the next visit with Dr. Gordon, a lot of the other injuries caused by the
industrial accident had gotten much worse. Dr. Gordon notes, "At this point, he is
complaining of as well as leg and calf cramping, numbness and tingling in his foot that
occurs in certain positions and small amounts of pressure. He is not sleeping well at
nighttime. He does have pain with SLR at around 45-50 degrees with increasing
discomfort and tightness in the sciatic nerve distribution with the Laseque maneuver.
The patient was given a prescription for Elavil 50mg g.h.s. to see if this will help with his
sleep and pain cycle. He also was given a refill for Percocet." (R. Vol. 2 at 136).
These problems have not only remained with me through present date but most
have continued to get worse. These problems along with their history have been fully
documented throughout volume 1,2, and 3 of the court records and, "although not in
chronological order", also in volume 4 and the Benson Brief.
On page 4, line 12, Jenkins stated; "After working for nearly a year as a
Serialization Manager, and contrary to his doctor's restrictions, Benson accepted a
position as an Assistant Consultant."
REPLY -

The correct title is Systems Consultant. (R. Vol. 4 at 17). The

Serialization job had ended a couple months before I accepted the Systems Consultant
job and I had been doing nothing at work. Dr. Gordon had given me restrictions of no
prolonged walking (able to self adjust) and no walking or standing, desk work only. (R.
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Vol. 3 at 382 misfiled). Dr. Gordon had also told me that, "This can take up to six
months to a couple years for full improvement." (R. Vol. 2 at 142). It had been a year
and a half since the accident and I wanted to see if I could get back up on my feet. As it
turned out, like Jenkins noted, it aggravated my injuries. It also taught me something that
Dr. Gordon told me just before surgery, something that I had been in denial of, he said;
"The good news is, I can put you back together, the bad news is, it will never get better, it
will only get worse and it's not a question of rather you will need more surgery but a
question of when."
On page 4, line 20, Jenkins stated; "Benson accepted early retirement and his last
day of work was September 29, 2000." (R. Vol. 4 at 20).
REPLY -

I did leave the payroll on September 30, 2000 however, I was not offered

an early retirement. My job title was given a surplus status and as I had previously
stated, my manager, Sheryl Lodder, and I had spoken numerous times about my
requesting a disability retirement since I was having more and more trouble with my
injuries and because every time I complained to Dr. Gordon, he always said "get off your
feet." (R. Vol. 4 pages 14-19). The other reason I left, was because none of the other
jobs that were available at Lucent, met the conditions under which I worked both the
Serialization and the Scheduling job. That being short days, and short weeks while
drawing full time pay and benefits. (R. Vol. 1 at 183). I was terminated/laid off on the
30th day of September, 2000.
After leaving Lucent, I waited the customary 5 months at which time I applied for
and received Social Security Disability effective September 30, 2000. It was approved
because of the multitude of injuries I received from the October 3, 1997 industrial
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accident. After receiving Social Security Disability, I filed for Workman's
Compensation on June 2, 2004 for the same reason. (R. Vol. 4 at 22).

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

On page 6, line 1, of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "... on May 25, 2005
Benson appealed the ALJ's decision to the Labor Commission. (R. Vol. 1 at 74).
REPLY -

I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that it was I in person

that filed the appeal. However, it was my previous counsel Tim Allen, and not only did
he not state a reason why the documents had not been included, he also didn't include the
other items we had discussed that needed to be part of the appeal. This was the second
time that he wasn't prepared or did substandard work on my case.
On Page 6, line 5, Jenkins stated; "Lucent's memorandum in opposition to review
argued that Lucent had never received the additional records and that I should have
produced them before the MRE was compiled. (R. Vol. 1 at 81-82). On line 7, Jenkins
also stated; "Lucent also noted that two of its own medical records had been excluded
from the MRE based on timeliness objections, and argued that it would be patently unfair
to allow me to add previously undisclosed documents to the MRE after the hearing, when
Lucent had not been allowed to add records to the MRE that had been disclosed prior to
the hearing." (R. Vol. 1 at 81, 82).
REPLY -

I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that these two

scenario's are one in the same however, Lucent was fully aware that their two medical
records were due 45 days before the hearing, yet they made no attempt to request an
7

extension of time and instead turned them in at their convenience. They were not only
late, they were late by approximately 38 days. (R. Vol. 4 at 3).
The other haft of this scenario, is the MRE and my request for additional records
to be considered by the ALJ, the Commission, the Commissioner, and this court. Jenkins
also stated, that I should have turned in all my medical records during the time frame that
the MRE's were being compiled or during the hearing. Upon retaining my previous
counsel, Tim Allen, he requested a copy of all my medical records. I advised him that I
would get him all of the records used during my Social Security hearing.
When I retrieved those records from the attorney that had handled my Social
Security case, they were still in his binder, in chronological order and page numbered to
meet the Social Security Administrations requirements. I reviewed them for accuracy
and completeness, copied them page by page and gave them to Tim Allen. I gave tin
copy to Tim during May of 2004, and they still had the page numbers on them from
Social Security. Shortly after that, I was asked to sign about a dozen authorization forms
for medical records. This was requested by the Appellee, and this I did. Then during
October 2004,1 was asked, per a request from the Appellee, via my counsel to sign an
authorization for them to get my employment records from Avaya. After that I didn't
hear anymore about records from anybody.
The first time I saw the MRE, was a few minutes before the hearing on April 21,
2005. I asked my counsel what they were and after being told, I asked where they came
from and why I hadn't had a chance to review them. He told me that Mark Anderson, the
counsel for the Appellee, had compiled them and that it wasn't necessary to review them
because it would be an open and shut case since the Appellee wouldn't have any
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evidence. I didn't have an opportunity to review those records until after the ALJ had
handed down her decision from the bench and closed the hearing.
In my Brief, on page 5, lines 5 - 7,1 made note that (R602-2-l(Hl) states: "the
parties are expected to exchange medical records during the discovery period." After this
note, I stated; "It is my contention that this never occurred." Because of this statement, I
apologize to Mr. Anderson, the Commission, and this court. That being said, raises the
following question. In the MRE, volume 2, pages 216 - 221, on the lower right hand
corner of each page, there are hand written numbers next to the typed page numbers for
the MRE. Those written numbers are the numbering that meets the requirements of the
Social Security Administration. Because there are only 6 pages in the MRE that have this
numbering, I wonder where the other 100 plus pages are with the same numbering.
The evidence shows that Mr. Anderson requested a copy of my Social Security
records from them. (Benson Brief, Addendum G). Based on the condition of the MRE,
and the fact that many of the missing/new pages of evidence that are included in my
Request for Reconsideration also have the same numbering on them, I must wonder if the
medical records that were included in the MRE were hand selected. Otherwise, I find it
to be rather suspicious and somewhat odd that there are not more pages in the MRE that
show that hand written numbering system from the Social Security Administration.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

On page 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Benson's contention that the
MRE was flawed as a whole due to organizational errors fails because the mere misfiling
9

of records in the MRE, without a showing that the misfilings prejudiced Benson, is not
sufficient to invalidate the MRE."
REPLY -

Jenkins may want this court to believe that the MRE is understandable as

it is by referring to the disastrous, disorganized condition of the MRE as "organizational
errors... mere misfiling of records", when in fact, there is little if any organization in
them at all. Again, as previously noted in the Benson Brief, on page 6, Rule R602-21(H4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged by medical
provider in chronological order and bound."
REPLY -

The problem with the lack of chronological order begins on the first page

of the MRE, the Records Index. It is my contention that it is impossible for anyone to
find, let alone understand all of my injuries and/or understand the treatment history
without being able to start by knowing which doctor/institution was seen first. The only
records, regardless of whether it's a doctor and/or a medical institution listed on the
Records Index that is in its correct order, is number 1, Alta View Hospital; number 3,
Canyon Sports Therapy; number 11, Jeff Chung, M.D. (ALJ excluded) and; number 12,
Dell C. Felix, P.T. (ALJ excluded). The following list will show the order in which they
are shown now and the order in which they should be shown.

Present
tab No.
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

First date
seen
Alta View Hospital
John P. Barbuto, M.D.
Canyon Sports Therapy
Alan L. Colledge, M.D.
Anthony G. Gordon, M.D.
Registered Physical Therapists
Michael A. Schreiner, Ph.D.
10

10-03-97
02-13-02
03-31-98
12-03-01
10-06-97
05-03-00
03-05-02

Correct
tab No.
1
8
3
7
2
5
9

8
9
10
11
12

University of UT. Pain Management Center 05-10-02
Randy Watson, M.D.
09-29-98
Gary R. Zeluff, M.D.
05-25-00
Jeff Chung, M.D. (ALJ disallowed)
03-29-05
Dell C. Felix, P.T. (ALJ disallowed)
04-04-05

10
4
6
11
12

On page 8, line 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Benson also argues that
the ALJ and the Labor Commission should have submitted the question of causation
concerning his left knee injury to a medical panel because there were conflicting medical
opinions regarding causation. However, the ALJ and the Commission were correct in not
convening a medical panel because the cause of Benson's left knee injury was irrelevant
due to the fact that he had failed to prove that he was totally disabled. Additionally, the
ALJ did not abuse her discretion by failing to analyze all of the issues surrounding
Benson's claim for benefits once she determined that his claim for permanent total
disability benefits had failed."
REPLY-

Although I have raised the question about causation concerning my left

knee, it is my contention that the records in the MRE clearly prove that my left knee is in
fact, one of the injuries that was caused by my accident on October 3, 1997. This as well
as other injuries are documented in the MRE and the Benson Brief on pages 13-31. As
an example, page 13 noted as tab 1 - pg 3, page 15 noted as tab 5 - pg 131, page 17
noted as tab5 - pg 149, page 17 noted as tab 5 - pg 150, etc., etc.,. These are only a few
of the notes on my left leg, foot and knee.
Had the ALJ been more thorough when she reviewed the MRE, she would have
already been aware that my left knee injury was in fact one of the many injuries that I
received on October 3,1997. If there is a question for a medical panel, I believe it would
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be how much damage would 1200 to 1500 hundred pounds of commercial grade
sheetrock do to something as fragile as the human body when it lands on it.

ARGUMENT

First, this Court should find that the MRE is completely lacking any kind of
chronological order and that it is complied in such a poor manner that it in no way meets
the requirements in Rule R602-2-l(H4). Secondly, this Court should also find that the
MRE is in such disarray that it would be impossible to determine the extent of all of my
injuries and there medical history. Additionally, the fact that there are so many important
medical documents, documents that I have provided to Commissioner Ellertson, that are
missing in the MRE, it would make it impossible for the ALJ to make an informed
decision based on all of the medical evidence. However, by doing so, the ALJ has caused
a substantial injustice.
On page 9 of the Appellee's Brief, Jenkins raised two issues with my Brief. First,
he stated; "where a Briefs overall analysis is so lacking that it shifts the burden of the
research and argument to the court... Benson's Brief is devoid of almost any relevant
legal analysis ... arguments are largely bald assertions ... brief is structured in such a
way that it requires the reader to guess at the topics he addresses and the arguments he
makes. Secondly,... it is Lucent's understanding that Benson has not directly challenged
any of the Commission's findings of fact other than its finding that there were not
significant conflicting opinions concerning the cause of Benson's left knee injury.
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Benson failed to marshal evidence as required to challenge a finding of fact.... Benson
has not even attempted to marshal the evidence."
REPLY-

In response to Jenkins two issues. First, I'm sure that my Brief is not

organized as well as the average attorney's however, I made a good faith effort trying to
organize it in a manner that I believe this court will find that it does not shift the burden
of research and argument to the court. Furthermore, I believe that this court will find that
it is not devoid of relevant legal analysis and that my arguments are not bald assertions.
Secondly, I believe that this court will in fact find that I have challenged the ALJ's
findings of fact, not only my left knee but everything that the ALJ included in her
findings of fact. In my brief, on page 12,1 referenced my response/marshaling of the
evidence to my Request for Reconsideration document. In my brief, I referenced the
following rules and statutes:
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-413
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-420(l)
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-601
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-801(1997)
Utah Code Ann. 34A-2-802(l)
Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(a)-changed to
34A-2-601
Utah Code Ann. 35-l-77(l)(9)-changed to
34A-2-601
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-8(2)
Utah Code Ann. 63-46b-14
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedures, Title II, Rule 11, (b)(1)(c)
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9 - changed to R602-2-2
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A4)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A5)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(A6)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-l(Hl)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H2)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H3)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-1 (H4)
Utah Admin. Code R602-2-2
All of these statutes and rules may be found in their entirety in Addendum A.
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POINT 1
A - Heading
On page 11, line 12 of the Appellee Brief, under the heading of Point 1, Jenkins
stated; "The Commission's reliance on the medical records exhibit was not an abuse of
discretion because any omissions in the records were caused by Benson's own failure to
include documents he had in his possession long before the evidentiary hearing."
REPLY -

I'm sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that I and I alone am

to blame for all of the records that are missing in my MRE. However, as previously
stated, and as required by R602-2- 1(H)(2), "... petitioner shall submit all relevant
medical records contained in his/her possession ... ."
I provided a complete copy of all the medical records that were used by my
counsel for Social Security Disability to my previous counsel for this case, Tim Allen, so
that he could exchange records with the respondent as required by R602-2- 1(H)(1).
These copies had been page numbered to meet the requirements of the Social Security
Administration.
R602-2- 1(H)(3) states; "... The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record
exhibit containing ALL RELEVANT MEDICAL RECORDS ... ALL RELEVANT
TREATMENT RECORDS THAT TEND TO PROVE OR DISPROVE A FACT IN
ISSUE...."
REPLY -

It is my contention, as proven by the additional medical records thai I have

provided in my Request for Review, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and, this
Reply to the Respondent's Brief, that this requirement was not met.
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R602-2- 1(H)(4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed, paginated,
arranged by medical care provider in chronological order and bound."
REPLY -

There is no chronological order of the medical care providers and it is my

contention that there is little if any chronological order of the medical record pages them
self.
R602-2- 1(H)(5) states; "... Late-filed medical records may or may not be
admitted at the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or for good cause
shown.
REPLY -

I'm sure that with the evidence I've shown, this court will agree that I

have shown good cause and therefore, the additional records should be considered as
additional proof that I am qualified for permanent total disability and therefore should
receive those benefits.
On page 12, line 17 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "... Benson has not
shown good cause to allow additional records to be admitted."
REPLY -

It is true that my previous counsel, Tim Allen, did not cite any reasons of

good cause when he prepared my Request for Review. That's another example of the
poor representation that he had provided to me. However, beginning with the Request for
Reconsideration, which I prepared myself, it is my contention that this court will find that
I in fact have shown good cause.
On page 12, line 18 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "He provided a number
of records to Lucent previous to the evidentiary hearing, all of which were incorporated
into the MRE."
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REPLY -

As previously stated, I did provide my previous counsel with a complete

copy of the medical records that were used for my Social Security Disability case, those
records still had the page numbering on them that was required by the Social Security
Administration. However, if as Jenkins stated, that all of those records were incorporated
into the MRE, why didn't the vast majority of the pages in the MRE still show the page
numbering that was required by the Social Security Administration. As an example, see
(R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221) at the lower right hand corner of the page.
On page 14, line 2 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Clearly, Lucent fulfilled
its statutory duty to complete the MRE and then submitted it to Benson for his
inspection."
REPLY -

It is my belief that this court will find that this statement is not only false,

but also misleading. It is my contention that Lucent did not fulfill their duty to compile
the MRE because it does not contain all of my medical records, it has no chronological
order and is therefore impossible to understand. Additionally, as previously stated, I'm
sure that Jenkins would like this court to believe that he submitted a copy of the MRE
directly to me however, the fact is that he had it delivered to my previous counsel, Tim
Allen, and that's where it stopped. I never saw it until a few minutes before the hearing.
On page 14, line 10 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "Finally, it would be
patently unfair to allow Benson to include additional documents in the MRE after he had
successfully petitioned the ALJ to exclude Lucent's expert reports for violating similar
technical timing requirements."
REPLY -

It is my belief that this court will see that the only similarity between the

ALJ excluding Lucent's reports and my request to include additional documents is that
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Lucent/Anderson/Jenkins were the only direct cause of both situations. Lucent was
aware of the 45 day requirement and had the option of requesting an extension of time,
which they apparently choose not to do. It was also Lucent's/Anderson/Jenkins
responsibility to compile the MRE based on the guide lines set down by the rules of the
Labor Commission which, apparently they also choose not to do.
It is for these reasons, that I, the petitioner, ask this court to find that the ALJ, the
Commission and, the Commissioner did in fact abuse its discretion by not reviewing the
additional documents that I have provided to them after the evidentiary hearing. These
documents included statements showing good cause.

B • Heading

On page 14, line 17 of the Appellee Brief, under Category B, Jenkins stated; "The
Medical Records Exhibit Did Not Include Any Significant Omissions." On line 20,
Jenkins stated; "... even if this decision were improper, it would be immaterial to the
denial of Benson's permanent total disability claim because the MRE did not include any
significant omissions." On page 15, line 1, Jenkins stated; "Benson criticizes the MRE
for being incomplete and it appears that the focus of his argument is the 58 pages of
documents he attached to his Request for Reconsideration to the Commissioner. (R. Vol.
1 at 96).
REPLY -

First, had Jenkins reviewed the court records and/or the Benson Brief

closer, he would have found that there are 71 pages instead of 58. (R. Vol. 1 at 113 183) (Benson Brief, page 27, line 18). Secondly, I'm sure that Jenkins would like this
17

court to believe that those 71 pages are the only problem with the MRE. Lastly, the MRE
as it is now, contains 535 pages. If the 303 pages of duplicates and/or junk pages were to
be removed, that would leave 233 pages of actual medical records. If the 71 missing
pages were added to the MRE, that's over 20% of the total record, there would be 355
pages of reliable medical records. Those 71 pages therefore play an important role in my
claim for permanent total disability. However, as noted throughout my Request for
Reconsideration, my Brief and, this Reply Brief, there are hundreds of other problems in
the MRE that combined with the missing documents are the cause of my being denied
permanent total disability. (R. Vol. 1 at 96 -111) (Benson Brief, pages 7, 13 - 33).
On page 15, line 3, Jenkins stated; "Many of the documents in question are not
appropriate for the MRE, given that they are correspondence, bills, and other documents
that are not "medical records."
REPLY -

It is my contention that anything written by a doctor that has anything to

do with the injury/illness, rather it be a note in the medical file, a correspondence 1o the
insurance carrier, the employer or whoever, is a medical document and therefore should
be in the MRE. It is also my contention, that any medical bills generated because of the
injury/illness, and tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue are also medical documents
and therefore, should be in the MRE. It is also my belief that this court will agree with
this statement.
On page 15, line 7, Jenkins stated; "... the additional documents do not change
the basic facts that are already set forth in the MRE." On line 15, Jenkins stated;"... the
records Benson seeks to add are merely redundant."
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REPLY -

It is my contention, and 1 believe that this court will agree, tl lat the

additional documents do in fact change the facts that are in the MRE. They are not
duplicates, they show new and different evidence and, they provide a complete picture of
all my injuries (here treatment history and therefore, can not be redundant.
On page 15, line 18, Jenkins stated; "... the additional records do not address the
reasons that the A! J at id 1 1 ic Coi i in lissioi i cited wl lei i dei i> i:t ig Bei ison's reqi lest for
benefits."
REPLY -

It is my belief that aftei tl lis con u t i eviews all of th z s\ idence. it will In id

that I have in fact addressed all of the reasons the ALJ cited to deny my request for
benefits. As an example, the ALJ stated that I only had one restriction, no prolonged
walking, when in fact, there are numerous restrictions. (R. Vol. 1 at 113)(R. Vol. 2 at
150)(R Vol. 3 at 382 - misfiled).
On page 15, line 19, Jenkins stated; "The ALJ held that Benson had not proved
that he was unable to perform his former work as a scheduler, that he had not proved that
he was iiiiaNe li1 pcifoim olh< i \\ml

In1 li.nl mil privr-l lh.il In, iii<lnslii,iil iitYiilnil

was the direct cause of his permanent total disability. These holdings were based largely
on the fact that he was able to perform., his job duties for se\ eral y ears before leaving
Lucent, that he only left Lucent once he was offered early retirement..."
REPLY -

It is true that I did return to work. However, it was only for 35 months

instead of several years. It is my contention that the ALJ completely ignored my
testimony in regards to my not working 8 hour days or 40 hour weeks. (R Vol. 4, page
32, lines 1-16). Had the ALJ and/or the Commissioner reviewed the documents that I
had requested to be added as new medical documents in my Request for Reconsideration,
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they would have found additional proof that I can not work a normal 8 hour day or a 40
hour week. (R. Vol. 1 at 113, 183). Once all the evidence has been reviewed by this
court, it is my contention that the court will support the fact that I have proven that the
industrial accident was the direct cause of my permanent total disability and, had the ALJ
taken the time that my MRE requires in order to be understood, instead of being in such a
hurry to hand down her decision from the bench, which she did, she would have handed
down a much different decision. Additionally, had the ALJ and/or Ihe Commissioner
reviewed the additional documents that I had requested to be added to the MRE, they
would have found additional evidence that the accident was the direct cause of my
permanent total disability. (R. Vol. 3 at 490, 492, 493)(R. Vol. 2 at 114 - misfiled, 115 —
misfiled, 112 - misfiled, 111 - misfiled, 109 - misfiled, 107 - misfiled, 103 - misfiled,
98 - misfiled, 94 - misfiled).
During the 35 months that I worked after the accident, as the evidence clearly
shows, my injuries continually got worse. I was always on a mix of multiple pain killers,
anti-inflammatories and a variety of other medications for nerve pain, infections, sleep,
sweating, etc., etc.. (R. Vol. 1 at 115-127)(R. Vol. at 226-245). As further proof that the
accident did cause my permanent total disability, there are numerous statements from Dr.
Watson that prior to the accident, there is no history of any of the medical problems that
I've had since October 3,1997 to the current date. (R. Vol. 1 at 141,170,172, 173,174,
175, 177, 178, 179, 180, and 181).
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B - Heading

On page 16, line 20, Jenkins stated; "The Commission's reliance on the MRE was
not an abuse of discretion despite the record's organizations
REPLY -

: >lems.

Rule 602-2-1(H)(4) states; "The medical records shall be indexed,

paginated, arranged by medical provider in chronological order and bound." I believe
that this court will agree with me as to my understanding of what the about rule means. I
believe that it means, indexed and paginated means tabbed and page numbered and the
remainder means that the medical prm ider/institutioii shcii ild be listed by first date seem,
in chronological order, and that the pages should be arranged by the date seen, in
chronological order. Because of the ah i lost complete lack of organization in (he MRE,
and the fact that there are so many missing medical records, this court should find that the
ALJ and the Commissioner did in fact abuse their discretion by relying on the MRE as
they are. (Benson Brief, page 6, lines 3,4).
On page 17, line 2, Jenkins stated; "... he has not demonstrated that these error's
affected how the Labor Commission decided his case."
REPLY -

After reviewing my Request for Reconsideration and my Brief, I believe

that this coinl u ill ugiiv liial ( hdvv in tail slmwii fii.ii tIn • iiintless errors have been the
cause of an undeniable negative effect on how the Labor Commission decided my case.
On page 1 ] , lint ic 9. let ikil is stated;' xBei ison 1 las not cited ai :n ' law suggesting that
the misfilings in an MRE in and of them selves invalidate the entire record."
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REPLY -

I may not have cited a law that covers that specific verbage. However, I

did cite the rule governing the MRE, its content and how it should be arranged. (Benson
Brief, page 6, lines 3, 4).
On page 17, line 11, Jenkins stated: "... he has not cited any evidence indicating
that the ALJ or the Commission had any difficulty navigating the MRE."
REPLY -

As a small example, that this is another false statement. On page 24, line

12 of the Appellee's own Brief, Jenkins stated; "Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own medical
expert...." It seems that if the ALJ, the Commission and Jenkins didn't have any
problems navigating the MRE, they would have known that Zeluff was not my medical
expert but instead, a doctor that was in fact provided by the Appellee. (R. Vol. 3 at 422,
423 misfiled). Additionally, I am sure that as this court reviews my Request for
Reconsideration, my Brief, and this Reply Brief, it will notice dozens of other exaimples
and will find that the ALJ, the Commission and, Jenkins have had lots of trouble trying to
navigate the MRE.
On page 17, line 16, Jenkins stated; "Without evidence that he was somehow
prejudiced by the misfilings, or that the Commission missed important evidence due to
the misfilings, they cannot be viewed as anything more serious than unfortunate but
inconsequential mistakes that did not affect the outcome of the case."
REPLY -

After this court reviews the MRE, my Request for Reconsideration, my

Brief, and the Reply Brief, I'm sure that this court will find that there was so much
important evidence that had been misfiled, overlooked and/or missing, that the ALJ
and/or the Commissioner made a grave error when they denied by request for benefits
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and refused to review/consider all of the new/missing evidence that I had requested lo Ix
considered therefore, they abused their discretion.
On page 17, line 21, Jenkins stated; "The mere fact that organizational errors exist
in the MRE is i

i validate the exhibit, and without evidence of a negative

effect on Benson's claim, there is no reason to assume that the Commission abused its
discretion by relying 01 1 tl t :,:: I\ IRE despite its ii i ^perfections."
REPLY -

It is my belief that this court will agree with me that the only evidence that

is needed to show a negative affect on my claim, is the fact that my claii11 v\ as denied.
Based on all the evidence that I've presented in the MRE, my Request for
Reconsideration, my Brief and this Reply Brief, this court should find that the ALJ, the
Commission and, the Commissioner did abuse their discretion.

D - Heading

On page 18, line 9 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "The record shows that
the Administrative Law Judge and Labor Commission reviewed ai id t iiiciei stood the
medical records." Additionally, on line 15, Jenkins stated; "Benson has not cited a single
piece of evidence that suggesting that the ALJ or the Commission failed to properly
review the evidence."
REPLY -

After reviewing all of the evidence that I have provided in the MRE, my

Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and, this Reply Brief, I believe that this court will
find that the above two statements are false. Furthermore, on page 18, line 21, Jenkins
stated; "... the Commissioner stated tl lat I le denied Bensoi I'S claii i I because '"tl le n ioi: e
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persuasive evidence already in the record convinces the Commission that Mr. Benson is
not permanently and totally disabled.'" (R. Vol. 1 at 86). Again, after reviewing all of
the evidence that Fve presented, Fm sure that this court will find that the more persuasive
evidence shows that I am in fact permanently and totally disabled and that this condition
was caused by my industrial accident on October 03, 1997.
On page 19, line 12, Jenkins stated; "She also addressed other considerations,
such as Dr. Barbuto's determination that Benson had '"obvious pain behaviors of a
psychosocial type"' accompanied by '"frequent wincing and melodrama in his
movements.'" (R. Vol. 1 at 69).
REPLY -

According to the Oxford Dictionary and Thesaurus, American Edition,

printed by Oxford University Press in 1996, the definition of psychosocial is; "of or
involving the influence of social factors or human interactive behavior." The definition
of wincing or wince is; "a start or involuntary shrinking movement showing pain or
distress." Lastly, the definition of melodrama is; " l a sensational dramatic piece with
crude appeals to the emotions and usu. A happy ending. 2 the genre of drama of this type.
3 language, behavior, or an occurrence suggestive of this. 4 hist, a play with songs
interspersed and with orchestral music accompanying the action." It appears that Dr.
Barbuto may be straying outside the limits of his medical license, which is in the practice
of Neurology not Psychology.
The following is a list of all the medications that Fve been required to take every
day, some of them once, some twice and, some of them three times a day, the brands and
names have changed since October 3,1997, but never the less, in one form or another,
Fve taken them since the accident. Those medications are; Lexapro, Robibul, Tricor,
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Zetia, Ultram, Baclofen, Mobic, Neurontin, Keflex, Lotensin, Mirapex, Requip and,
Zyrtec. Of these medications, Zyrtec, or another medication in the same category, was
the only one of these medications that I use to take on a seasonal basic, because of
seasonal allergies. Soi i le of tl ic many side affects tl ml these medications ha

• that

they always upset my stomach, they speed up my metabolism, therefore I ' m always
hungry and, they make me shake worse and differentl) tl i.a i tl ic si v< ikes tl i.at < ti e cause d by
pain. If I were to eat whenever I was hungry, which I do more than I should, F d be
heavier than I am now, which is approximately 20 pounds more than I weighted before
the accident. Therefore, it is my belief that that may be why Dr. Barbuto, thinks that,
some of my shaking, was caused by what he called melodrama. It is true that I shake
because of the pain, and it is also true that I shake worse because I ' m hungry and
somewhat weak. However, it is my belief that unless a doctor had been treating me for
some time, they won ild i lot be aware of that fact. Therefore , it is h] r contentioi 1 that a
doctor, like Dr. Barbuto, that only saw me for about 15 minutes on one occasion, could
determine what he stated.
On March 05, 2002,1 had an appointment with Dr. Michael A. Schreiner, Ph. D.
who is a Clinical Psychologist, he didn't draw any of the same conclusions that Barbuto
did and I do believe that he is much more qualified in his field than Barbuto who is
practicing Neurology. My appointment with Dr. Schreiner was at the request of the
Social Security Administration for an independent evaluation. (R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221).
Therefore, based on the evidence that I've provided this court in reference to Dr.
Barbuto. this cent n I si 101 ild coi isidei his i epoi 11 :> be i ini eliable ai id tl lerefore strickeii froi n
the record. I would also request this court find that the ALJ, the Commission and, the
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Commissioner did in fact abuse its discretion while reviewing the MRE and interpreting
the evidence in it.

POINT 2
A, B & C - Heading
On page 20, line 8 of the Appellee Brief, Jenkins stated; "The Administrative Law
Judge and Labor Commission did not abuse their discretion by not submitting the; case to
a medical panel." On line 16, Jenkins stated; "He believes this error was either caused by
missing/overlooked documents in the MRE ...." In support of these two statements, on
page 24, line 5, Jenkins stated; "Benson's entire argument concerning the necessity of a
medical panel arises from a paragraph in the ALJ's findings of fact in which she states
that Dr. Gordon disagreed with Dr. Zeluff as to the cause of the petitioner's left knee
condition. (R. Vol. 1 at 69). It relies entirely on notes Dr. Gordon took concerning an
office visit Benson made in July of 2000. The disagreement concerning the cause of
Benson's left knee condition is not significant, ... Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own
medical expert...." On line 16, Jenkins also stated; "... the document upon which
Benson relies to claim a significant difference of opinion concerning causation is a brief
memo in Dr. Gordon's records detailing Benson's office visit on July 27, 2000. The
doctor's note states that'" at this point, it appears that he has as irritation of the left knee
probably aggravated from the abnormal gait from his right foot injury. Would
recommend getting an MRI of the left knee to rule out a lateral meniscus tear." (R. Vol. 2
at 157).
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On page 24, line 22, Jenkins stated his personal opinions as follows; "This
document was clearly not meant as a statement of Dr. Gordon's opinion concerning the
cause of Benson's left knee injury, nor was it a medical report. Rather, it is a brief memo
meant for Benson's

fill

•

r. oordon of what was discussed during Benson's

visit. His statement that '"at this point, it appears that he has an irritation of the left knee
probably aggravated

fi 01 :t i tl le i igl it foot ii lji it ) " " is i lot language that suggests an

opinion concerning causation, but rather appears to be a vague hypothesis procedure."
On page 25, line 7, Jenkins further stated; "Given the nature of the document and
the extremely vague language that related Dr. Gordon's "'opinion,'" the ALJ acted both
reasonably and rationally by determining that Dr. Gordon's office note did not create a
significant conflicting opinion in the face of Dr. Zeluff s clearly stated opinion contained
in the medical report. As such, the ALJ did not abuse her discretion by ruling on the
question of causation \ \ it! i the assistance of ait i ledical panel.''
REPLY -

As shown in the MRE, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief and,

this Repl> Br ief to the \ j

i i n Ii icii isti ial '"\ ccident was 3i:ie that clearlj caused

multiple injuries. Therefore, it is my contention that since the ALJ only recognized one
injury, my right foot, she did not review my entire MRE. As cited in the Benson Brief,
page 8, line 6, in the Willardson case, the court stated; "... allowing the ALJ, who has no
medical training and prossesses no medical degrees, to determine medical causation as a
threshold question ... effectively eviscerates the beneficence of subsection (a)."
Furthermore, it is my contention that since, as the evidence proves, my accident involved
multiple injuries, not just my right foot, and since the VI J I n is 1 u id i IO i nedic al ti aining
and therefore, most likely can not comprehend the amount of damage that 1200 to 1500
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pounds of commercial grade sheetrock can do when it impacts something as fragile as the
human body.
Because this Industrial Accident caused multiple injuries and because there is
almost ten years of treatment history, which has caused it to become very paper intensive
and therefore complex, there is only one way that this case can be understood. That
being, all of my medical records must be reviewed, not just the ones in the MRE, and the
records must be in chronological order. The evidence proves that it is a complex,
multiple injury case. (Benson Brief, pages 13 - 27). The evidence also proves that there
was no history of any injuries/medical problems, except an occasional allergy/sinus
problem, before the Industrial Accident on October 03,1997. (Benson Brief, pages 28 31)(R. Vol. 2, page 127, line 33).
My left leg, knee and foot have been documented every since the Industrial
Accident on October 03, 1997, starting at the Alta View Hospital Emergency Room.
(Benson Brief, pages 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, etc., etc.,)(Benson Brief, page 15, tab 5).
As previously mentioned, Jenkins stated; "Dr. Zeluff, the Petitioner's own
medical expert, ..." (Appellee Brief, page 24, line 12). Mr. Jenkins erred by making that
statement and had he been more thorough, while reviewing the MRE, he would have
known that my appointment with Dr. Zeluff, was scheduled by Gates McDonald, the
insurance carrier at the time, for the purpose of an independent medical evaluation. (R.
Vol. 3 at 420-424).
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D - Heading

Under the D - Heading, on pages 25, 26 and, 27, Jenkins stated; "Benson has not
proved that his sleep problems or cognitive difficulties are related in any way to his left
knee injury. ... his sleep problems are caused by '"nervous legs."' A condition that
makes both of his legs "'flip uncontrollably'" at night. He has made various vague
statements suggesting tl mat 1 lis i ien oi is legs are related to 1 lis left ki i x injui > , but has it: l ::it
presented any medical evidence demonstrating a connection between his twitching legs
and 1 lis left knee injury. ... 1 le has not si tow i 11 low or w 1 i> 1 lis lef I knee injury could have
caused nervous leg syndrome in both of his legs."
Lastly, Jenkins stated; "Benson testified that he has been on "'dozens and
dozens'" of different medication's. ... he has not specified which medications he believes
caused his cognitive problems, nor has he submitted any medical evidence to prove that
his cognitive difficulties are a result of any of the dozens of i iiedications he has been on,
or that any such medications were necessitated by his left knee injury. In the end, the
cause of Benson's left ki lee • inji n > is totally ii i elevant ..."
REPLY -

I don't know where Mr. Jenkins got the idea that any of my problems were

caused I: ;; < n n lei t knee, I certainly ha\ en't n tade that statemei it I he e\ idence clearly
shows that along with my left knee, all of my injuries and medical problems were all
caused by the industrial accident. F m sure that Mr. Jenkins would like this court to
believe that all of my injuries/medical problems all happened at different times and
therefore are not to be considered as being a part of my industrial accident however, as
the preponderance of substantial evidence clearly show s, tl ie> were all cai ised bj ( 1 it:
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accident on October 03, 1997. As noted by the Alta View Hospital Emergency Room,
Dr. Gordon, Dr. Watson, and others, both my legs and feet were impacted, twisted and/or
crushed by the 1200 to 1500 pounds of sheetrock. This impact caused breaks,
dislocations, swelling, ligament and tissue damage, nerve damage/numbness/pain,
circulatory and bruising damage and other problems. It also caused the beginning of my
sleep problems which were first noted by Dr. Gordon on November 17, 1998. (Benson
Brief, page 15). The nerve damage/nervous legs/nervous leg syndrome/flipping legs, leg
and calf cramping, and sweating, etc., etc., problems were also caused by the accident.
Between October 03, 1997 and December 16, 1998 (my first impairment rating),
Kendra Hefner who was the Authorized Benefit Delegate for the Disability Management
group with Lucent Technologies and was my contact person after every doctor's visit,
asked me almost every time I contacted her, "you sound depressed, are you alright?"
Between January 28,1998 (my return to work date) and June 10, 1999, my physical
condition as well as my mental condition steadily declined, I was not getting any better.
While I was at an appointment with Dr. Watson, he diagnosed me as showing signs of
depression, stress, and anxiety. (R. Vol. 3 at 484). On June 18, 1999, he stated;
"Depression which is reactive." (R. Vol. 3 at 486). On June 15,1999, he stated; (He has
been suffering from depression related to his previous on the job injury." (R. Vol. 3 at
485).
Additionally, I was scheduled to see Michael A. Schreiner, Ph. D. (Clinical
Psychologist) by the Division of Disability Determination Services of the Social Security
Administration on March 05, 2002, for the possible problems of depression and anxiety.
This was an independent medical evaluation. (R. Vol. 2 at 216 - 221). Dr. Schreiner
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stated in his report; "It is deemed by this examiner that Mr. Benson appears to be
struggling with a dysthymic-type of depression - that being chronic, mild depression,
rather than a major depressive disorder at this time. The depression is also related to his
injuries in ii -

is not sleeping at night due to physic .al paii 1 ai id does not engage in

previously enjoyed activities due to the pain." (R. Vol. 2, page 220, lines 8 - 14).
. Prior to being released I i oi i i tl te ei i lei gei icj ' rooi n oi :i Octobei 03, 199 5 , Dr.
McLaughlin prepared a personalized instruction sheet that I was required to read and
sign. In those instructions, Dr. McLaughlin stated; "Some diseases worsen despite proper
treatment. Some problems begin with unusual symptoms and require time before the
correct diagnosis can be made." (R. Vol. 2, page 8, lines 6, 7).
To conclude my reply to the D - Heading, although it lacks some detail, Dr.
Watson summarized most of my injuries and medical problems that were caused by my
industrial accident. (Benson Brief pages 29, 30). 1 his witl i the in n i leroi is other
documents that Dr. Watson has written pretty much covers everything. (Benson Brief,
pages 24, 29, 30)(F \ < 1 1 | « ig< : , 1
181). As additional proof, in paragraph two of this document, Dr. Watson stated; "The
history of medication prescribed by Dr. Haymes (retired) also supports Mr. Benson's
medical history at this time." (R. Vol. 1 pages 115 - 127).
Throughout the Appelle Brief, Mr. Jenkins has stated that this injury and that
injury are irrelevant. However, as Fve previously stated in the Reply Brief, the evidence
clearly shows that all of my injuries/medical problems that I've covered in my Request
for Reconsideratior

Brief, and this R epl> Brief, were it i fact cai lsed bj I i i.y iiicli isti ial

accident. Additionally, Mr. Jenkins has stated in The Appellee Brief; "... the MRE did
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not include any significant omissions." (Appellee Brief, page 14, line 22). Jenkins also
stated; "The '"omitted"' documents largely reiterate the undisputed fact that Benson
suffered a serious workplace injury." (Appellee Brief, page 15, lines 7, 8). Jenkins also
stated; "The records Benson seeks to add are redundant,..." (Appellee Brief, page 15,
lines 15, 16). "... the additional records do not address the reasons that the ALJ and
Commission cited when denying Benson's request for benefits." (Appelle Brief, page 15,
lines 18, 19). "None of Benson's additional documents dispute or negate the facts that
the ALJ and the Commission relied upon in denying Benson's request for permanent total
disability. Thus, their omission from the MRE was irrelevant and insignificant."
(Appellee Brief, page 16, lines 11-14).
REPLY -

It is my contention that the following evidence disproves Mr. Jenkins

statements in the preceding paragraph. The following evidence is mostly located in (R.
Vol. 1) and will be referred to below by page number only,
Page 113 - Physician's Assessment of Physical Capacities prepared by Dr.
Watson. It proves that I have more restrictions than just limited walking.
Page 114 - Must use cane - from Dr. Gordon - supporting Dr. Watson's
statement. (Benson Brief, page 29, lines 23, 24). It also supports (R. Vol. 1 page 183),
the document from my last manager while at Lucent Technologies.
Pages 115 - 127 - This is the list of prescriptions that Dr. Watson referred to as
supporting evidence that the types of medications that I was taking prior to October 03,
1997, were not the type required to treat any of the types of injuries and/or medical
problems that were caused by my industrial accident. (Benson Brief, page 29).
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Pages 1 2 8 , 1 2 9 - These are documents that proves that Dr. Zeluff s appointment
was scheduled b y Gates McDonald, the insurance carrier at the time of injury, for the
purpose of doing an independent medical evaluation. It should have been filed in the
M R E in fii >nt < >f (R \ ; < )1 3, page 497).
Page 130 - Is the detailed description of what happened and how it happened. It
has been signed If i il le presents of a Notai > Pi iblic b) the c -i ily witness to the accident. It
is the same description as (R. Vol. pages 70, 71 and Vol. 3 pages 460,461 - 462,463),
with the exception that I added a paragraph to the beginning which addressed why Dr.
Zeluff s report should be considered invalid and/or not credible, additionally, I added 5
paragraphs to the end for the benefit of Pauline Dutton at Gates McDonald (the insurance
carrier at the time). Pages 70, 71, 460, 461, 462, ai id 463 ai e all misfiled at id a re
duplicates of each other. One of these two page records should have been filed behind
(R. Vol. 3, page 503).
Pages 1 3 1 - 1 3 7 - a r e documents that prove that my knee supports were being
purchased and paid for by Gates McDonald as far back as December 11, 1997.
Pages 138 - 140 - are documents that should have been filed in the MRE at (R.
Vol. 2, tab 5) and (R. Vol. 2, tab 2) respectively.
Pages 141 - 169 - are medical records/documents that should have been filed in
the MRE at (R. Vol. 3, tab 9).
Page 170 - is an apology letter to the Labor Commission from Dr. Watson's
clinic manager for not sending all of my records to be included in the MRE.
Page 171

is a cii lplicatc to page 113 s> if i )
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Pages 172 - 181 - these are more documents that should have been included in
the records of Dr. Watson.
Page 182 - are the results from Dr. Smith's tests for the EMG and NCS that Dr.
Barbuto recommended that I have done, but refused to do himself. Additionally, because
I had seen Dr. Barbuto and he had referred me to Western Neurological, the doctor's at
Western Neurological refused to see anybody that had been seen by Dr. Barduto. (R. Vol.
1 at 139).(R. Vol. 2, pages 67, 68, 69). These tests did show neurological damage to both
legs. Dr Smith recommended that I have an MRI for my lower back. The insurance
company, Gates McDonald, denied his recommendation. (R. Vol. 3, pages 465, 466).
These 2 pages are duplicates with each other and are misfiled.
Page 183 - is a document from my last manager while at Lucent Technologies
and is further proof that I always used a cane and that I was not working full 8 hour days
and/or full 40 hour weeks.
To reiterate what I stated in my Request for Reconsideration, "... the Judge had
handed down her decision from the bench,...." (R. Vol. 1 at 105). In the Respondent's
response to my Request for Reconsideration, Mark L. Anderson stated; "The Petitioner
criticizes the ALJ for handing down '"her decision from the bench.'" ... This statement
is incorrect. The ALJ took the matter under advisement, and issued her Order on April
28, 2005, which was one week after the hearing took place."
I stand behind my statement and therefore contend that either Mr. Anderson has
forgotten or did not tell the Commissioner the truth. That being said, the Hearing
Transcript is not a true and accurate record of what took place in the hearing on April 21,
2002.
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Utah Code 34A-2-413 states that in order to qualify for permanent total disability
I have to meet the following requirements.
(i)

the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of
it npairments as a result ol 1:1 le ii ldi isti ial ace i iei it oi

JCCII lpatioi lal

disease

that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii)

the employee is permanently totally disabled,

(iii)

the industrial or occupational disease was the direct cause of the
employee's permanent total disability.

A complete copy of this rule is in Addendum A.
REPLY to item (i): The evidence clearly proves that I have met this
requirement. (Appellee Brief, page 15, line 8) (R > ol 2 at 127), (R Vol 3 at
380, 401 misfiled/duplication), (R. Vol. 3 at 477 misfiled), (R. Vol. 2 at 218 220), (Benson Brief; pages 1 3 , 1 4 - 3 1 ; -. (R * : 1 I | >ages 96

183)

REPLY to item (ii): The evidence that was overlooked by the ALJ and the
Commissioner in the MRE, the evidence that was included with my Motion for
Review, my Request for Reconsideration, my Brief, and this Reply Brief, clearly
proves that I am permanently totally disabled as a result of my industrial accident.
REPLY to item (iii): The evidence clearly proves that the industrial
accident was the direct cause of my permanent total disability, (the same evidence
as referenced above in the first two items).
In summary, when this court reviews the poor condition of the MRE, and
all of the i elevant ei idence, this coi n t shoi ild fn id tl lat the pi epondei ance of
substantial evidence clearly proves that my industrial accident is the cause of my
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being permanently totally disabled and therefore, I am qualified to receive
benefits. Lastly, as stated by Dr. Watson, "It is also my opinion that he probably
will not recover from the foot injury." (R. Vol. 1 at 180).

CONCLUSION

Because of the afore mentioned evidence that is included in my MRE, my
Request for Review, my Request for Reconsideration, the Benson Brief, and this
Reply Brief, this court should find that the ALJ abused her discretion in numerous
ways by not rejecting the MRE because of its lack of organization and
chronological order and by rendering her decision from the bench at the end of the
hearing. This court should also find that the Commission and Commissioner
abused their discretion in numerous ways by not taking corrective action upon
being notified that the MRE did not meet their own standards, by not excepting
the missing/new medical records after being notified of the condition of the MRE,
and for not excepting my reasons for them not being included prior to the
evidentiary hearing.
Therefore, as I previously stated in my Brief, I respectfully request that
this court not only reverse the ALJ's decision to dismiss my case with prejudice,
but also give my request for permanent total disability compensation the final
approval. It is my contention that because of the manner in which this case has
been handled, there has been a substantial injustice inflicted upon myself.
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Dated this 0

day of April, 2007.

^ ^ ^ 7
Jenson
Petitioner/Appellant
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Christensen & Jensen, P.C.
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Alan Hennebold
160 East 300 South, Suite 300
P.O. Box 146600
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6600
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Addendum A
Statutes and Rules

34A-2-413. Permanent total disability — Amount of payments — Rehabilitation.
(1) (a) In cases of permanent total disability resulting from an industrial accident or occupational
disease, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this section.
(b) To establish entitlement to permanent total disability compensation, the employee must prove by
a preponderance of evidence that:
(i) the employee sustained a significant impairment or combination of impairments as a result of the
industrial accident or occupational disease that gives rise to the permanent total disability entitlement;
(ii) the employee is permanently totally disabled; and
(iii) the industrial accident or occupational disease was the direct cause of the employee's permanent
total disability.
(c) To establish that an employee is permanently totally disabled the employee must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that:
(i) the employee is not gainfully employed;
(ii) the employee has an impairment or combination of impairments that limit the employee's ability
to do basic work activities;
(iii) the industrial or occupationally caused impairment or combination of impairments prevent the
employee from performing the essential functions of the work activities for which the employee has
been qualified until the time of the industrial accident or occupational disease that is the basis for the
employee's permanent total disability claim; and
(iv) the employee cannot perform other work reasonably available, taking into consideration the
employee's:
(A) age;
(B) education;
(C) past work experience;
(D) medical capacity; and
(E) residual functional capacity.
(d) Evidence of an employee's entitlement to disability benefits other than those provided under this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act, if relevant:
(i) may be presented to the commission;
(ii) is not binding; and
(iii) creates no presumption of an entitlement under this chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational
Disease Act.
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 312-week entitlement,
compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited
as follows:
(a) compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the injury;
(b) compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, plus $5 for a dependent
spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age of 18 years, up to a maximum of four dependent
minor children, but not exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (2)(a) nor exceeding the
average weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury; and
(c) after the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate under Subsection (2)(b) shall
be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar.
(3) This Subsection (3) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out
of and in the course of the employee's employment on or before June 30,1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 weeks of permanent total
disability compensation except as outlined in Section 34A-2-703 as in effect on the date of injury.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through
34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial
312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
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(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance
carrier by the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund's
liability to the employee.
(d) After an employee has received compensation from the employee's employer, its insurance
carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of disabilities amounting to 312 weeks
of compensation at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers'
Reinsurance Fund shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation,
(e) Employers' Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under this Subsection (3) or Section 34A-2-703.
(4) This Subsection (4) applies to claims resulting from an accident or disease arising out of and in
the course of the employee's employment on or after July 1,1994.
(a) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for permanent total disability compensation.
(b) The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay compensation for any
combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in this section and Sections 34A-2-410 through
34A-2-412 and Part 5, Industrial Noise, in excess of the amount of compensation payable over the initial
312 weeks at the applicable permanent total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2).
(c) Any overpayment of this compensation shall be recouped by the employer or its insurance carrier
by reasonably offsetting the overpayment against future liability paid before or after the initial 312
weeks.
(5) Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the compensation payable by
the employer, its insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund, after an employee has received
compensation from the employer or the employer's insurance carrier for any combination of disabilities
amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable total disability compensation rate, shall be
reduced, to the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social Security retirement
benefits received by the employee during the same period.
(6) (a) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability is not final, unless otherwise agreed
to by the parties, until:
(i) an administrative law judge reviews a summary of reemployment activities undertaken pursuant to
Chapter 8, Utah Injured Worker Reemployment Act;
(ii) the employer or its insurance carrier submits to the administrative law judge:
(A) a reemployment plan as prepared by a qualified rehabilitation provider reasonably
designed to return the employee to gainful employment; or
(B) notice that the employer or its insurance carrier will not submit a plan; and
(iii) the administrative law judge, after notice to the parties, holds a hearing, unless otherwise
stipulated, to:
(A) consider evidence regarding rehabilitation; and
(B) review any reemployment plan submitted by the employer or its insurance carrier under
Subsection (6)(a)(ii).
(b) Before commencing the procedure required by Subsection (6)(a), the administrative law judge
shall order:
(i) the initiation of permanent total disability compensation payments to provide for the employee's
subsistence; and
(ii) the payment of any undisputed disability or medical benefits due the employee.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a), an order for payment of benefits described in Subsection (6)
(b) is considered a final order for purposes of Section 34A-2-212.
(d) The employer or its insurance carrier shall be given credit for any disability payments made under
Subsection (6)(b) against its ultimate disability compensation liability under this chapter or Chapter 3,
Utah Occupational Disease Act
(e) An employer or its insurance carrier may not be ordered to submit a reemployment plan. If the
employer or its insurance carrier voluntarily submits a plan, the plan is subject to Subsections (6)(e)(i)
through (iii).
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(i) The plan may include retraining, education, medical and disability compensation benefits, job
placement services, or incentives calculated to facilitate reemployment funded by the employer or its
insurance carrier.
(ii) The plan shall include payment of reasonable disability compensation to provide for the
employee's subsistence during the rehabilitation process.
(iii) The employer or its insurance carrier shall diligently pursue the reemployment plan. The
employer's or insurance carrier's failure to diligently pursue the reemployment plan shall be cause for the
administrative law judge on the administrative law judge's own motion to make a final decision of
permanent total disability.
(f) If a preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not possible, the
administrative law judge shall order that the employee be paid weekly permanent total disability
compensation benefits.
(7) (a) The period of benefits commences on the date the employee became permanently totally
disabled, as determined by a final order of the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends:
(i) with the death of the employee; or
(ii) when the employee is capable of returning to regular, steady work.
(b) An employer or its insurance carrier may provide or locate for a permanently totally disabled
employee reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work in a job earning at least minimum wage
provided that employment may not be required to the extent that it would disqualify the employee from
Social Security disability benefits.
(c) An employee shall fully cooperate in the placement and employment process and accept the
reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time work.
(d) In a consecutive four-week period when an employee's gross income from the work provided
under Subsection (7)(b) exceeds $500, the employer or insurance carrier may reduce the
employee's permanent total disability compensation by 50% of the employee's income in excess of
$500.
(e) If a work opportunity is not provided by the employer or its insurance carrier, a permanently
totally disabled employee may obtain medically appropriate, part-time work subject to the offset
provisions contained in Subsection (7)(d).
(f) (i) The commission shall establish rules regarding the part-time work and offset,
(ii) The adjudication of disputes arising under this Subsection (7) is governed by Part 8,
Adjudication.
(g) The employer or its insurance carrier shall have the burden of proof to show that medically
appropriate part-time work is available.
(h) The administrative law judge may:
(i) excuse an employee from participation in any job that would require the employee to undertake
work exceeding the employee's medical capacity and residual functional capacity or for good cause; or
(ii) allow the employer or its insurance carrier to reduce permanent total disability benefits as
provided in Subsection (7)(d) when reasonable, medically appropriate, part-time employment has been
offered but the employee has failed to fully cooperate.
(8) When an employee has been rehabilitated or the employee's rehabilitation is possible but the
employee has some loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability.
(9) As determined by an administrative law judge, an employee is not entitled to disability
compensation, unless the employee fully cooperates with any evaluation or reemployment plan under
this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The administrative law judge shall dismiss
without prejudice the claim for benefits of an employee if the administrative law judge finds that the
employee fails to fully cooperate, unless the administrative law judge states specific findings on the
record justifying dismissal with prejudice.
(10) (a) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, both arms, both feet, both
legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such body members constitutes total and permanent
disability, to be compensated according to this section.
mhtml:file://C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\My Documents\Rules and Statutes-2.mht

4/5/2007

(b) A finding of permanent total disability pursuant to Subsection (10)(a) is final.
(11) (a) An insurer or self-insured employer may periodically reexamine a permanent total disability
claim, except those based on Subsection (10), for which the insurer or self-insured employer had or has
payment responsibility to determine whether the worker remains permanently totally disabled.
(b) Reexamination may be conducted no more than once every three years after an award is final,
unless good cause is shown by the employer or its insurance carrier to allow more frequent
reexaminations.
(c) The reexamination may include:
(i) the review of medical records;
(ii) employee submission to reasonable medical evaluations;
(iii) employee submission to reasonable rehabilitation evaluations and retraining efforts;
(iv) employee disclosure of Federal Income Tax Returns;
(v) employee certification of compliance with Section 34A-2-110; and
(vi) employee completion of sworn affidavits or questionnaires approved by the division.
(d) The insurer or self-insured employer shall pay for the cost of a reexamination with
appropriate employee reimbursement pursuant to rule for reasonable travel allowance and per diem as
well as reasonable expert witness fees incurred by the employee in supporting the employee's claim for
permanent total disability benefits at the time of reexamination.
(e) If an employee fails to fully cooperate in the reasonable reexamination of a permanent total
disability finding, an administrative law judge may order the suspension of the employee's permanent
total disability benefits until the employee cooperates with the reexamination.
(f) (i) Should the reexamination of a permanent total disability finding reveal evidence that
reasonably raises the issue of an employee's continued entitlement to permanent total disability
compensation benefits, an insurer or self-insured employer may petition tlie Division of Adjudication for
a rehearing on that issue. The petition shall be accompanied by documentation supporting the insurer's
or self-insured employer's belief that the employee is no longer permanently totally disabled.
(ii) If the petition under Subsection (1 l)(f)(i) demonstrates good cause, as determined by the Division
of Adjudication, an administrative law judge shall adjudicate the issue at a hearing.
(iii) Evidence of an employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work may not be the
sole basis for termination of an employee's permanent total disability entitlement, but tlie evidence of the
employee's participation in medically appropriate, part-time work under Subsection (7) may be
considered in the reexamination or hearing with other evidence relating to the employee's status and
condition.
(g) In accordance with Section 34A-1-309, the administrative law judge may award reasonable
attorneys fees to an attorney retained by an employee to represent the employee's interests with respect
to reexamination of the permanent total disability finding, except if the employee does not prevail, the
attorneys fees shall be set at $1,000. The attorneys fees shall be paid by the employer or its insurance
carrier in addition to the permanent total disability compensation benefits due.
(h) During the period of reexamination or adjudication if the employee fully cooperates, each insurer,
self-insured employer, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall continue to pay the permanent total
disability compensation benefits due the employee.
(12) If any provision of this section, or the application of any provision to any person or
circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section shall be given effect without the invalid
provision or application.
Amended by Chapter 295,2006 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A02043_.Z_IP 7,823 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this Title|All_Titles|Legislative HomeJPage
mhtml:file://C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\My Documents\Rules and Statutes-2.mht

4/5/2007

34A-2-420. Continuing jurisdiction of commission — No authority to change statutes of
limitation — Authority to destroy records — Interest on award — Authority to approve final
settlement claims.
(1) (a) The powers and jurisdiction of the commission over each case shall be continuing.
(b) After notice and hearing, the Division of Adjudication, commissioner, or Appeals Board in
accordance with Part 8, Adjudication, may from time to time modify or change a former finding or order
of the commission.
(c) This section may not be interpreted as modifying in any respect the statutes of limitations
contained in other sections of this chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act.
(d) The commission may not in any respect change the statutes of limitation referred to in Subsection
(l)(c).
(2) Records pertaining to cases that have been closed and inactive for ten years, other than cases of
total permanent disability or cases in which a claim has been filed as in Section 34A-2-417, may be
destroyed at the discretion of the commission.
(3) Awards made by a final order of the commission shall include interest at the rate of 8% per
annum from the date when each benefit payment would have otherwise become due and payable.
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (1) and Section 34A-2-108, an administrative law judge shall review
and may approve the agreement of the parties to enter into a full and final:
(a) compromise settlement of disputed medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements under this
chapter or Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act; or
(b) commutation and settlement of reasonable future medical, disability, or death benefit entitlements
under this chapter or Chapter 3 by means of a lump sum payment, structured settlement, or other
appropriate payout.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 34A0205Q.ZIP 2,688 Bytes
Sections in this Chapter]Chapters in this TitlejAH TitleslLegislative Home Page
Last revised: Tuesday, October OS, 2006
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34A-2-60L Medical panel, director, or consultant — Findings and reports — Objections to
report — Hearing — Expenses.
(1) (a) The Division of Adjudication may refer the medical aspects of a case described in this
Subsection (l)(a) to a medical panel appointed by an administrative law judge:
(i) upon the filing of a claim for compensation arising out of and in the course of employment for:
(A) disability by accident; or
(B) death by accident; and
(ii) if the employer or the employer's insurance carrier denies liability.
(b) An administrative law judge may appoint a medical panel appointed by an administrative law
judge upon the filing of a claim for compensation based upon disability or death due to an occupational
disease.
(c) A medical panel appointed under this section shall consist of one or more physicians specializing
in the treatment of the disease or condition involved in the claim.
(d) As an alternative method of obtaining an impartial medical evaluation of the medical aspects of a
controverted case, the division may employ a medical director or one or more medical consultants:
(i) on a full-time or part-time basis; and
(ii) for the purpose of:
(A) evaluating the medical evidence; and
(B) advising an administrative law judge with respect to the administrative law judge's ultimate factfinding responsibility.
(e) If all parties agree to the use of a medical director or one or more medical consultants, the medical
director or one or more medical consultants shall be allowed to function in the same manner and under
the same procedures as required of a medical panel.
(2) (a) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant may do the following to the extent
the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant determines that it is necessary or desirable:
(i) conduct a study;
(ii) take an x-ray;
(iii) perform a test; or
(iv) if authorized by an administrative law judge, conduct a post-mortem examination.
(b) A medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall make:
(i) a report in writing to the administrative law judge in a form prescribed by the Division of
Adjudication; and
(ii) additional findings as the administrative law judge may require.
(c) In an occupational disease case, in addition to the requirements of Subsection (2)(b), a medical
panel, medical director, or medical consultant shall certify to the administrative law judge:
(i) the extent, if any, of the disability of the claimant from performing work for remuneration or
profit;
(ii) whether the sole cause of the disability or death, in the opinion of the medical panel, medical
director, or medical consultant results from the occupational disease; and
(iii) (A) whether any other causes have aggravated, prolonged, accelerated, or in any way contributed
to the disability or death; and
(B) if another cause has contributed to the disability or death, the extent in percentage to which the
other cause has contributed to the disability or death.
(d) (i) The administrative law judge shall promptly distribute full copies of a report submitted to the
administrative law judge under this Subsection (2) by certified mail with return receipt requested to:
(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; and
(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(ii) Within 15 days after the report described in Subsection (2)(d)(i) is deposited in the United States
post office, the following may file with the administrative law judge written objections to the report:
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(A) the applicant;
(B) the employer; or
(C) the employer's insurance carrier.
(iii) If no written objections are filed within the period described in Subsection (2)(d)(ii), the report is
considered admitted in evidence.
(e) (i) The administrative law judge may base the administrative law judge's finding and decision on
the report of:
(A) a medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) one or more medical consultants.
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(e)(i), an administrative law judge is not bound by a report
described in Subsection (2)(e)(i) if other substantial conflicting evidence in the case supports a contrary
finding.
(f) (i) If an objection to a report is filed under Subsection (2)(d), the administrative law judge may set
the case for hearing to determine the facts and issues involved.
(ii) At a hearing held pursuant to this Subsection (2)(f), any party may request the administrative law
judge to have any of the following present at the hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) the one or more medical consultants.
(iii) For good cause shown, the administrative law judge may order the following to be present at the
hearing for examination and cross-examination:
(A) a member of a medical panel, with or without the chair of the medical panel;
(B) the medical director; or
(C) a medical consultant.
(g) (i) The written report of a medical panel, medical director, or one or more medical consultants
may be received as an exhibit at the hearing described in Subsection (2)(f).
(ii) Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(g)(i), a report received as an exhibit under Subsection (2)(g)(i)
may not be considered as evidence in the case except as far as the report is sustained by the testimony
admitted.
(h) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultant before July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Employers' Reinsurance Fund
established in Section 34A-2-702:
(i) expenses of the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and
(ii) the expenses of the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before
the administrative law judge.
(i) (i) For any claim referred under Subsection (1) to a medical panel, medical director, or medical
consultant on or after July 1, 1997, the commission shall pay out of the Uninsured Employers' Fund
established in Section 34A-2-704 the expenses of:
(A) the study and report of the medical panel, medical director, or medical consultant; and
(B) the medical panel's, medical director's, or medical consultant's appearance before the
administrative law judge.
(ii) Notwithstanding Section 34A-2-704, the expenses described in Subsection (2)(i)(i) shall be paid
from the Uninsured Employers' Fund whether or not the employment relationship during which the
industrial accident or occupational disease occurred is localized in Utah as described in Subsection 34A2-704(20).
Amended by Chapter 303, 2002 General Session
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34A-2-801. Initiating adjudicative proceedings — Procedure for review of administrative
action.
(1) (a) To contest an action of the employee's employer or its insurance carrier concerning a
compensable industrial accident or occupational disease alleged by the employee, any of the following
shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) the employee; or
(ii) a representative of the employee, the qualifications of whom are defined in rule by the
commission.
(b) To appeal the imposition of a penalty or other administrative act imposed by the (division on the
employer or its insurance carrier for failure to comply with this chapter or Chapter 3, Uitah Occupational
Disease Act, any of the following shall file an application for hearing with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) the employer;
(ii) the insurance carrier; or
(iii) a representative of either the employer or the insurance carrier, the qualifications of whom are
defined in rule by the commission.
(c) A person providing goods or services described in Subsections 34A-2-407(12) and 34A-3-108
(12) may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-2-407 or 34A-3-108.
(d) An attorney may file an application for hearing in accordance with Section 34A-1-309.
(2) Unless a party in interest appeals the decision of an administrative law judge in accordance with
Subsection (3), the decision of an administrative law judge on an application for hearing filed under
Subsection (1) is a final order of the commission 30 days after the date the decision is issued.
(3) (a) A party in interest may appeal the decision of an administrative law judge by filing a motion
for review with the Division of Adjudication within 30 days of the date the decision is issued.
(b) Unless a party in interest to the appeal requests under Subsection (3)(c) that the appeal be heard
by the Appeals Board, the commissioner shall hear the review.
(c) A party in interest may request that an appeal be heard by the Appeals Board by filing the request
with the Division of Adjudication:
(i) as part of the motion for review; or
(ii) if requested by a party in interest who did not file a motion for review, within 20 days of the date
the motion for review is filed with the Division of Adjudication.
(d) A case appealed to the Appeals Board shall be decided by the majority vote of the Appeals Board.
(4) All records on appeals shall be maintained by the Division of Adjudication. Those records shall
include an appeal docket showing the receipt and disposition of the appeals on review.
(5) Upon appeal, the commissioner or Appeals Board shall make its decision in accordance with
Section 34A-1-303.
(6) The commissioner or Appeals Board shall promptly notify the parties to any proceedings before it
of its decision, including its findings and conclusions.
(7) The decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is final unless within 30 days
after the date the decision is issued further appeal is initiated under the provisions of this section or Title
63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
(8) (a) Within 30 days after the date the decision of the commissioner or Appeals Board is issued,
any aggrieved party may secure judicial review by commencing an action in the court of appeals against
the commissioner or Appeals Board for the review of the decision of the commissioner or Appeals
Board.
(b) In an action filed under Subsection (8)(a):
(i) any other party to the proceeding before the commissioner or Appeals Board shall be made a
party; and
(ii) the commission shall be made a party.
(c) A party claiming to be aggrieved may seek judicial review only if the party has exhausted the
party's remedies before the commission as provided by this section.
(d) At the request of the court of appeals, the commission shall certify and file with the court all
mhtml:file://C:\Documents and Settings\Owner\My DocumentsMJtah Code Section 34A-2-8... 4/5/2007

documents and papers and a transcript of all testimony taken in the matter together with the decision of
the commissioner or Appeals Board.
Amended by Chapter 295, 2006 General Session
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34A-2-802. Rules of evidence and procedure before commission — Admissible evidence.
(1) The commission, the commissioner, an administrative law judge, or the Appeals Board, is not
bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by any technical or formal rules or
procedure, other than as provided in this section or as adopted by the commission pursuant to this
chapter and Chapter 3, Utah Occupational Disease Act. The commission may make its investigation in
such manner as in its judgment is best calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the parties and to
carry out justly the spirit of the chapter,
(2) The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof of any fact in dispute all evidence
deemed material and relevant including, but not limited to the following:
(a) depositions and sworn testimony presented in open hearings;
(b) reports of attending or examining physicians, or of pathologists;
(c) reports of investigators appointed by the commission;
(d) reports of employers, including copies of time sheets, book accounts, or other records; or
(e) hospital records in the case of an injured or diseased employee.
Renumbered and Amended by Chapter 375,1997 General Session
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63-46b-8. Procedures for formal adjudicative proceedings — Hearing procedure.
(1) Except as provided in Subsections 63-46b-3 (d)(i) and (ii), in all formal adjudicative proceedings,
a hearing shall be conducted as follows:
(a) The presiding officer shall regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant
facts and to afford all the parties reasonable opportunity to present their positions.
(b) On his own motion or upon objection by a party, the presiding officer:
(i) may exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious;
(ii) shall exclude evidence privileged in the courts of Utah;
(iii) may receive documentary evidence in the form of a copy or excerpt if the copy or excerpt
contains all pertinent portions of the original document;
(iv) may take official notice of any facts that could be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of
Evidence, of the record of other proceedings before the agency, and of technical or scientific facts within
the agency's specialized knowledge.
(c) The presiding officer may not exclude evidence solely because it is hearsay.
(d) The presiding officer shall afford to all parties the opportunity to present evidence, argue,
respond, conduct cross-examination, and submit rebuttal evidence.
(e) The presiding officer may give persons not a party to the adjudicative proceeding the opportunity
to present oral or written statements at the hearing.
(f) All testimony presented at the hearing, if offered as evidence to be considered in reaching a
decision on the merits, shall be given under oath.
(g) The hearing shall be recorded at the agency's expense.
(h) Any party, at his own expense, may have a person approved by the agency prepare a transcript of
the hearing, subject to any restrictions that the agency is permitted by statute to impose to protect
confidential information disclosed at the hearing.
(i) All hearings shall be open to all parties.
(2) This section does not preclude the presiding officer from taking appropriate measures necessary
to preserve the integrity of the hearing.
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
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63-46b-14. Judicial review — Exhaustion of administrative remedies.
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in actions where
judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute.
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative remedies available,
except that:
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if this chapter or any
other statute states that exhaustion is not required;
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to exhaust any or all
administrative remedies if:
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to the public benefit
derived from requiring exhaustion.
(3) (a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 30 days after the
date that the order constituting the final agency action is issued or is considered to have been issued
under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3) (b).
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as respondents and shall meet
the form requirements specified in this chapter.
Amended by Chapter 72, 1988 General Session
Download Code Section Zipped WP 6/7/8 6 3 J EOTLZIP 2,280 Bytes
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Rule 11. The record on appeal.
(a) Composition of the record on appeal. The original papers and exhibits filed in the trial court, including the
presentence report in criminal matters, the transcript of proceedings, if any, the index prepared by the clerk of the trial
court, and the docket sheet, shall constitute the record on appeal in all cases. A copy of the record certified by the clerk
of the trial court to conform to the original may be substituted for the original as the record on appeal. Only those
papers prescribed under paragraph (d) of this rule shall be transmitted to the appellate court.
(b) Pagination and indexing of record.
(b)(1) Immediately upon filing of the notice of appeal, the clerk of the trial court shall securely fasten the record in a trial
court case file, with collation in the following order:
(b)(1)(A) the index prepared by the clerk;
(b)(1)(B) the docket sheet;
(b)(1)(C) all original papers in chronological order;
(b)(1)(D) all published depositions in chronological order;
(b)(1)(E) all transcripts prepared for appeal in chronological order;
(b)(1)(F) a list of all exhibits offered in the proceeding; and
(b)(1)(G) in criminal cases, the presentence investigation report.
(b)(2)(A) The clerk shall mark the bottom right corner of every page of the collated index, docket sheet, and all original
papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover page only of each volume of
transcripts constituting the record with a sequential number using one series of numerals for the entire record.
(b)(2)(B) If a supplemental record is forwarded to the appellate court, the clerk shall collate the papers, depositions,
and transcripts of the supplemental record in the same order as the original record and mark the bottom right corner of
each page of the collated original papers as well as the cover page only of all published depositions and the cover
page only of each volume of transcripts constituting the supplemental record with a sequential number beginning with
the number next following the number of the last page of the original record.
(b)(3) The clerk shall prepare a chronological index of the record. The index shall contain a reference to the date on
which the paper, deposition or transcript was filed in the trial court and the starting page of the record on which the
paper, deposition or transcript will be found.
(b)(4) Clerks of the trial and appellate courts shall establish rules and procedures for checking out the record after
pagination for use by the parties in preparing briefs for an appeal or in preparing or briefing a petition for writ of
certiorari.
(c) Duty of appellant. After filing the notice of appeal, the appellant, or in the event that more than one appeal is taken,
each appellant, shall comply with the provisions of paragraphs (d) and (e) of this rule and shall take any other action
necessary to enable the clerk of the trial court to assemble and transmit the record. A single record shall be
transmitted.
(d) Papers on appeal.
(d)(1) Criminal cases. Ail of the papers in a criminal case shall be included by the clerk of the trial court as part of the
record on appeal.
(d)(2) Civil cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the
clerk of the trial court shall include all of the papers in a civil case as part of the record on appeal.
(d)(3) Agency cases. Unless otherwise directed by the appellate court upon sua sponte motion or motion of a party, the
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agency shall include all papers in the agency file as part of the record.
(e) The transcript of proceedings; duty of appellant to order; notice to appellee if partial transcript is ordered.
(e)(1) Request for transcript; time for filing. Within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, the appellant shall request
from the court executive a transcript of such parts of the proceedings not already on file as the appellant deems
necessary. The request shall be in writing and shall state that the transcript is needed for purposes of an appeal.
Within the same period, a copy shall be filed with the clerk of the trial court and the clerk of the appellate court. If the
appellant desires a transcript in a compressed format, appellant shall include the request for a compressed format
within the request for transcript. If no such parts of the proceedings are to be requested, within the same period the
appellant shall file a certificate to that effect with the clerk of the trial court and a copy with the clerk of the appellate
court.
(e)(2) Transcript required of all evidence regarding challenged finding or conclusion. If the appellant intends to urge on
appeal that a finding or conclusion is unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence, the appellant shall include in the
record a transcript of all evidence relevant to such finding or conclusion. Neither the court nor the appellee is obligated
to correct appellant's deficiencies in providing the relevant portions of the transcript.
(e)(3) Statement of issues; cross-designation by appellee. Unless the entire transcript is to be included, the appellant
shall, within 10 days after filing the notice of appeal, file a statement of the issues that will be presented on appeal and
shall serve on the appellee a copy of the request or certificate and a copy of the statement. If the appellee deems a
transcript of other parts of the proceedings to be necessary, the appellee shall, within 10 days after the service of the
request or certificate and the statement of the appellant, file and serve on the appellant a designation of additional
parts to be included. Unless within 10 days after service of such designation the appellant has requested such parts
and has so notified the appellee, the appellee may within the following 10 days either request the parts or move in the
trial court for an order requiring the appellant to do so.
(f) Agreed statement as the record on appeal. In lieu of the record on appeal as defined in paragraph (a) of this rule,
the parties may prepare and sign a statement of the case, showing how the issues presented by the appeal arose and
were decided in the trial court and setting forth only so many of the facts averred and proved or sought to be proved as
are essential to a decision of the issues presented. If the statement conforms to the truth, it, together with such
additions as the trial court may consider necessary fully to present the issues raised by the appeal, shall be approved
by the trial court. The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the statement to the clerk of the appellate court within the
time prescribed by Rule 12(b)(2). The clerk of the trial court shall transmit the index of the record to the clerk of the
appellate court upon approval of the statement by the trial court.
(g) Statement of evidence or proceedings when no report was made or when transcript is unavailable. If no report of
the evidence or proceedings at a hearing or trial was made, or if a transcript is unavailable, or if the appellant is
impecunious and unable to afford a transcript in a civil case, the appellant may prepare a statement of the evidence or
proceedings from the best available means, including recollection. The statement shall be served on the appellee, who
may serve objections or propose amendments within 10 days after service. The statement and any objections or
proposed amendments shall be submitted to the trial court for settlement and approval and, as settled and approved,
shall be included by the clerk of the trial court in the record on appeal.
(h) Correction or modification of the record. If any difference arises as to whether the record truly discloses what
occurred in the trial court, the difference shall be submitted to and settled by that court and the record made to conform
to the truth. If anything material to either party is omitted from the record by error or accident or is misstated, the parties
by stipulation, the trial court, or the appellate court, either before or after the record is transmitted, may direct that the
omission or misstatement be corrected and if necessary that a supplemental record be certified and transmitted. The
moving party, or the court if it is acting on its own initiative, shall serve on the parties a statement of the proposed
changes. Within 10 days after service, any party may serve objections to the proposed changes. All other questions as
to the form and content of the record shall be presented to the appellate court.
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R602. Labor Commission, Adjudication.
R602-2.
Adjudication of Workers1 Compensation and Occupational
Disease Claims.
j^SDZSZSu? Pleadings and Discovery.
@ . Definitions.
1. "Commission" means the Labor Commission.
2. "Division" means the Division of Adjudication within the
Labor Commission.
3.
"Application for Hearing" means the request for agency
action regarding a workers1 compensation claim.
M)
"Supporting medical documentation" means a Summary of
Medical Record or other medical report or treatment note completed
by a physician that indicates the presence or absence of a medical
causal connection between benefits sought and the alleged
industrial injury.
r5j
"Authorization to Release Medical Records" is a form
authorizing the injured workers1 medical providers to provide
medical records and other medical information to the commission or
a party.
^6)
"Supporting
documents" means
supporting
medical
documentation, list of medical providers, Authorization to Release
Medical Records and, when applicable, an Appointment of Counsel
Form.
7. "Petitioner" means the person or entity who has filed an
Application for Hearing.
8. "Respondent" means the person or entity against whom the
Application for Hearing was filed.
9.
"Discovery motion" includes a motion to compel or a
motion for protective order.
B. Application for Hearing.
1. Whenever a claim for compensation benefits is denied by
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests with the
injured worker, or medical provider, to initiate agency action by
filing an Application for Hearing with the Division. Applications
for hearing shall include an original, notarized Authorization to
Release Medical Records.
2. An employer, insurance carrier, or any other party with
standing under the Workers1 Compensation Act may obtain a hearing
before the Adjudication Division by filing a request for agency
action with the Division.
3. All Applications for Hearing shall include any available
supporting medical documentation of the claim where there is a
dispute over medical issues.
Applications for Hearing without
supporting documentation and a properly completed Authorization to
Release Medical Records may not be mailed to the employer or
insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents have
been provided.
In addition to respondent's answer, a respondent
may file a motion to dismiss the Application for Hearing where
there is no supporting medical documentation filed to demonstrate
medical causation when such is at issue between the parties.
4.
When an Application for Hearing with appropriate
supporting documentation is filed with the Division, the Division
shall forthwith mail to the respondents a copy of the Application
for
Hearing,
supporting
documents
and
Notice
of
Formal

Adjudication and Order for Answer.
5.
In cases where the injured worker is represented by an
attorney, a completed and signed Appointment of Counsel form shalL
be filed with the Application for Hearing or upon retention-of the
attorney.
C. Answer.
1.
The respondent (s) shall have 30 days from the date of
mailing of the Order for Answer, to file a written answer to the
Application for Hearing.
2.
The answer shall admit or deny liability for the^claim
and shall state the reasons liability is denied. The answer shall
state all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail
that the petitioner and the Division may be fully informed of the
nature and substance of the defenses asserted.
3.
All answers shall include a summary of benefits which
have been paid to date on the claim, designating such payments by
category, i.e. medical expenses, temporary total disability,
permanent partial disability, etc.
4.
When liability is denied based upon medical issues,
copies of all available medical reports sufficient to support the
denial of liability shall be filed with the answer.
5.
If the answer filed by the respondents fails to
sufficiently explain the basis of the denial, fails to include
available medical reports or records to support the denial, or
contains affirmative defenses without sufficient factual detail to
support the affirmative defense, the Division may strike the
answer filed and order the respondent to file within 20 days, a
new answer which conforms with the requirements of this rule.
6. All answers must state whether the respondent is willing
to mediate the claim.
7.
Petitioners are allowed to timely amend the Application
for Hearing, and respondents are allowed to timely amend the
answer, as newly discovered information becomes available that
would warrant the amendment.
The parties shall not amend their
pleadings later than 45 days prior to the scheduled hearing
without leave of the Administrative Law Judge.
8. Responses and answers to amended pleadings shall be filed
within ten days of service of the amended pleading without further
order of the Labor Commission.
D. Default.
1.
If a respondent fails to file an answer as provided in
Subsection C above, the Division may enter a default against the
respondent.
2. If default is entered against a respondent, the Division
may conduct any further proceedings necessary to take evidence and
determine the issues raised by the Application for Hearing without
the participation of the party in default pursuant to Section 6346b-ll(4), Utah Code.
3.
A default of a respondent shall not be construed to
deprive the Employer's Reinsurance Fund or Uninsured Employers1
Fund of any appropriate defenses.
4.
The defaulted party may file a motion to set aside the
default under the procedures set forth in Section 63-46b-ll(3),
Utah Code.
The Adjudication Division shall set aside defaults

upon written and signed stipulation of all parti es to the action.
E. Waiver of Hearing.
1. The parties may, with the approval of the administrative
law judge, waive their right to a hearing and enter into a
stipulated
set of facts, which may be submitted to the
administrative law judge.
The administrative law judge may use
the stipulated facts, medical records and evidence in the record
to make a final determination of liability or refer the matter to
a Medical Panel for consideration of the medical issues pursuant
to R602-2-2.
2.
StipuidLeu idcis silan include sufficient facts to
address all tho issues raised in tho Apolication for Hearing and
answer.
3.
in cases where Medical Fanei review is required, the
administrative law judge may forward the evidence in the record,
including hul r*ot 1 i.mited to, medical records, fact stipulations,
radiographs and deposition transcripts, to a medical panel for
assistance in resolving the medi ca.l issuo.s
F. Discovery.
1. Upon filing the answer, the respondent and the petitioner
may commence discovery.
Discovery allowed under this rule may
include interrogatories, requests for production of documents,
depositions, and medical examinations.
Discovery shall not
include requests for admissions. Appropriate discovery under this
rule shall focus on matters relevant to the claims and defenses at
issue in the case. All discovery requests are deemed continuing
and shall be promptly supplemented by the responding party as
information comes available.
9
. Without leave of the administrative law judge, or written
stipulation, any party may serve upon any other party written
interrogatories, not exceeding 25 in number, including all
discrete subparts, to be answered by the party served.
The
frequency or extent of use of interrogatories, requests for
production of documents, medical examinations and/or depositions
shall be limited by the administrative 1 aw judge if * is
determi ned that:
a.
The discovery sought :i s unreasonab] y cumulative or
duplicative, or is obtainable from another source that is more
convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive;
b. The party seeking discovery has had ample opportun;i %- i• v
discovery in the action to obtain the discovery sought; or
c. The discovery is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking
into account the needs of the case, the amount in controversy,
limitations on the parties1 resources, and the importance of the
issues at stake in the adjudication.
3.
Upon reasonable notice, the respondent: may require the
petitioner to submit to a medical examination by a physician of
the respondent's choice.
4. All parties may conduct depositions pursuant ,.„ .
Rules of Civil Procedure and Section 34A-1-308, Utah Code.
5.
Requests for production of documents are allowed, but
limited to matters relevant to the claims and defenses at issue in
the case, and shall not include requests for documents provided
with
the
p e t i tloner1s
App1i c a t ion
for
Hearing,
nor
the

respondentsf answer.
6.
Parties shall diligently pursue discovery so as not to
delay the adjudication of the claim.
If a hearing has been
scheduled, discovery motions shall be filed no later than 45 days
prior to the hearing unless leave of the administrative law judge
is obtained.
7.
Discovery motions shall contain copies of all relevant
documents pertaining to the discovery at issue, such as mailing
certificates and follow up requests for discovery. The responding
party shall have 10 days from the date the discovery motion is
mailed to file a response to the discovery motion.
8.
Parties conducting discovery under this rule shall
maintain mailing certificates and follow up letters regarding
discovery to submit in the event Division intervention is
necessary to complete discovery. Discovery documents shall not be
filed with the Division at the time they are forwarded to opposing
parties.
9. Any party who fails to obey an administrative law judge's
discovery order shall be subject to the sanctions available under
Rule 37f Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
G. Subpoenas.
1. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery
proceedings to compel the attendance of witnesses. All subpoenas
shall be signed by the administrative law judge assigned to the
case, or the duty judge where the assigned judge is not available.
Subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses shall be served
at least 14 days prior to the hearing consistent with Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 45. Witness fees and mileage shall be paid by the
party which subpoenas the witness.
2.
A subpoena to produce records shall be served on the
holder of the record at least 14 days prior to the date specified
in the subpoena as provided in Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 45.
All fees associated with the production of documents shall be paid
by th^party which subpoenas the record.
OJ^ Medical Records Exhibit.
£Y)
The parties are expected to exchange medical records
during the discovery period.
(T!)
Petitioner shall submit all relevant medical records
contained in his/her possession to the respondent for the
preparation of a joint medical records exhibit at least twenty
(20) working days prior to the scheduled hearing.
^T)
The respondent shall prepare a joint medical record
exhibit containing all relevant medical records.
The medical
record exhibit shall include all relevant treatment records that
tend to prove or disprove a fact in issue.
Hospital nurses'
notes, duplicate materials, and other non-relevant materials need
not be included in the medical record exhibit.
^f?^ The medical records shall be indexed, paginated, arranged
by medical care provider in chronological order and bound.
5.
The medical record exhibit prepared by the respondent
shall be delivered to the Division and the petitioner or
petitioner's counsel at least ten (10) working days prior to the
hearing. Late-filed medical records may or may not be admitted at
the discretion of the administrative law judge by stipulation or

for good cause shown.
6. The administrative law ^dge may require the respondent
to submit an additional copy of the joint medical record exhibit
in cases referred to a medical panel7. The petitioner is responsible L- obtaii i radiograpl is and
diagnostic
films for review by the medical panel.
The
•.administrative law judge shall issue subpoenas where necessary to
obtain radiology fi1 ms.
1. Hearing.
] . Notices of hearing shall be mailed to the addresses of
record of the parties.
The parties shall provide current
addresses to the Division for receipt of notices or risk the entry
of default and loss of the opportunity to participate at the
hearing.
2.
Judgment may be entered without a hearing after default
is entered or upon stipulation and waiver of a hearing by the
parties.
3. No later than 4 5 days prior to the scheduled hearing, all
parties shall
file a signed pretrial disclosure form that
identifies:
(1) fact witnesses the parties actually intend to
call at the hearing; (2) expert witnesses the parties actually
intend to call at the hearing; (3) language translator the parties
intend to use at the hearing; (4) exhibits, including reports, the
parties intend to offer in evidence at the hearing; (5) the
specific benefits or relief claimed by the petitioner; (6) the
specific defenses that the respondent actually intends to
litigate; (7) whether, or not, a party anticipates that the case
wi] 1 take more than four hours of hearing time; (8) the job
categories or titles the respondents claim the petitioner is
capable of performing if the claim is for permanent total
disability, and; (9) any other issues that the parties intend to
ask
the
administrative
law
judge
to
adjudicate.
The
administrative
law
judge may
exclude
witnesses, exhibits,
evidence, claims, or defenses as appropriate of any party who
fails to timely file a signed pre-trial disclosure form as set
forth above.
The parties shall supplement the pre-trial
disclosure form with information that newly becomes available
after filing the original form.
The pre-trial disclosure form
does not replace other discovery allowed under these rules.
••;>'• 4.
If the petitioner requires the services of language
translation during the hearing, the petitioner has the obligation
of providing a person who can translate between the petitioner's
native language and English during the hearing.
If the
respondents
are
dissatisfied
with
the
proposed
translator
identified by the petitioner, the respondents may provide a
qualified translator for the hearing at the respondent's expense.
5,
The petitioner shall appear at the hearing prepared to
.outline the benefits sought, such as the periods for which
compensation and medical benefits are sought, the amounts of
unpaid medical bills, and a permanent partial disabil ity rating,
if applicable.
If mileage reimbursement for travel to receive
medical care is sought, the petitioner shall bring documentation
of mileage, including the dates, the medical provider seen and the
total mileage.

6.
The respondent shall appear at the hearing prepared to
address the merits of the petitioner's claim and provid€> evidence
to support any defenses timely raised.
7.
Parties are expected to be prepared to present their
evidence on the date the hearing is scheduled.
Requests for
continuances may be granted or denied at the discretion of the
administrative law judge for good cause shown. Lack of diligence
in preparing for the hearing shall not constitute good cause for a
continuance.
8.
Subject to the continuing jurisdiction of the Labor
Commission, the evidentiary record shall be deemed closed at the
conclusion of the hearing, and no additional evidences will be
accepted without leave of the administrative law judge.
J. Motions-Time to Respond.
Responses to all motions other than discovery motions shall
be filed within ten (10) days from the date the motion was filed
with the Division.
Reply memoranda shall be filed within
seven
(7) days from the date a response was filed with the Division.
K. Notices.
1.
Orders and notices mailed by the Division to the last
address of record provided by a party are deemed served on that
party.
2. Where an attorney appears on behalf of a party, notice of
an action by the Division served on the attorney is considered
notice to the party represented by the attorney.
L. Form of Decisions.
Decisions of the presiding officer in any adjudicative
proceeding shall be issued in accordance with the provisions of
Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, Utah Code.
M. Motions for Review.
1. Any party to an adjudicative proceeding may obtain review
of an Order issued by an Administrative Law Judge by filing a
written request for review with the Adjudication Division in
accordance with the provisions of Section 63-46b-12 and Section
34A-1-303, Utah Code.
Unless a request for review is properly
filed, the Administrative Law Judge's Order is the final order of
the Commission.
If a request for review is filed, other parties
to the adjudicative proceeding may file a response within 20
calendar days of the date the request for review was filed.
If
such a response is filed, the party filing the original request
for review may reply within 10 calendar days of the date the
response was filed.
Thereafter the Administrative Law Judge
shall:
a.
Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order after
holding such further hearing and receiving such further evidence
as may be deemed necessary;
b. Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental Order;
or
c. Refer the entire case for review under Section 34A-2-801,
Utah Code.
2.
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental
Order, as provided in this subsection, it shall be final unless a
request for review of the same is filed.
N. Procedural Rules.

In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Division shall
generally follow the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure regarding
discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, except as the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure are modified by the express provisions of
Section 34A-2-802, Utah Code or ->^ m^\/ hn nfh^rwi so modified by
these rules.
0.
Requests for Reconsideration .niu Petil. Loris J or Judicial
Review.
A request for reconsideration of an Order on Motion for
Review may be allowed and shall be governed by the provisions of
Section 63-46b-13, Utah Code. Any petition for judicial review of
final agency action shall be governed by the provisions of Section
63-4 6b-14, Utah Code.
T2Gp%^2=25 Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel.
^J
Pursuant to Section 34A-2-601, the Commission adopts the
following guidelines in determining the necessity of si lbmitting a
case to a medical panel:
A, A pane] w:i]] be utilized by th< ;•< imi n i :strative Law Judge
where one or more significant medical issues may be involved.
Generally a significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting
medical reports
significant medical issues are involved when
there are:
1.
C o n f l i c t i n o m e d i <:a!
• is:; r •} '.';<-] !
.:.•':* he
injury or disease;
2.
Conflicting
medical
reports
ui
permanent
physical
impai rment which vary more than 5% of the whole person,
3. Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total
cutoff date which vary more than 90 days;
4.
Conflicting medical opinions *'^Iat<
of
permanent total disability, and/or
Medical expenses i n controversy amount m g i JIK-:
lan
-.
.:\ hearing oii objections . . i.
panel report may be
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony
showing a need to clarify the medical panel report. Where there
is a proffer of new written conflicting medical evidence, the
Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, re-submit the
new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification.
C.
The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured
woirker to be examined by another physician for the purpose of
obtaining a further medical examination or evaluation pertaining
to the medical issues involved, and to obtain a report addressing
these medical issues in all cases where:
1. The treating physician has failed
-iu^*
,
i
impairment rating, and/or
A substantial injustice may occur without such further
Z

v . i i i,, j

i ' ;li .

b.
Any expenses of the study and report; < i a medical panel
or medical consultant and of their appearance at .. - earing, as
well as any expenses
for further medical
nation or
evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Ld, „^.i:,-.>, shall be
paid from the Uninsured Employers1 Fund, as di rected by Section
34A-2-603

